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Man flourishing and religious freedom: Testify from over 150 countries

Human flourishing and religious liberty: Bear witness from over 150 countries

  • Christos Andreas Makridis

PLOS

10

  • Published: Oct 1, 2020
  • https://doi.org/ten.1371/journal.pone.0239983

Abstract

This paper studies the spatial and time serial patterns of religious liberty across countries and estimates its result on measures of human flourishing. First, while in that location are significant cross-country differences in religious liberty, it has declined in the by decade across countries, specially among countries that rank higher in economic freedom. Second, countries with greater religious freedom however exhibit greater levels of economical freedom, especially holding rights. Tertiary, using micro-information across over 150 countries in the world betwixt 2006 and 2018, increases in religious freedom are associated with robust increases in measures of human flourishing even subsequently controlling for fourth dimension-invariant characteristics across space and time and a wide array of time-varying state-specific factors, such as economic activity and institutional quality. Fourth, these improvements in well-beingness are primarily driven past improvements in civil liberties, such equally women empowerment and freedom of expression.

Introduction

The United states was founded by individuals fleeing religious persecution from the Anglican church in Great Britain. These individuals who initially settled the country, and somewhen the Founding Fathers, not only did not distinguish between ceremonious and religious freedom, merely too viewed religious freedom as humanity's nigh primal form of freedom [1].

While there is a large literature on the effects of regulation and property rights on economic and social development, at that place is a much smaller literature on the role of religious freedom. This comes at a time when almost 80% of people throughout the world live in a "religiously restricted surroundings," prompting the Department of State, and the United States at large, to champion religious liberty as a national and economic security priority [2].

Descriptive show suggests that countries with greater religious freedom have greater levels of economic development [3, 4]. Notwithstanding, whether such a human relationship is causal is a challenging question because of ii misreckoning forces that movement in reverse directions. On ane manus, countries with greater religious liberty may also accept better economic institutions, like property rights, that promote economic evolution and human flourishing [5–7]. On the other hand, religious amalgamation is negatively associated with economic growth [8, 9]. The primary contribution of this paper is to explore whether such a plausibly causal relationship between religious freedom and well-being exists. Fig 1 provides suggestive evidence that the answer is yes: the countries that experienced the greatest growth in religious liberty between 2006 and 2018 also experienced the greatest growth in human flourishing, which we ascertain and investigate in the paper ahead.

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Fig one. Motivating evidence on religious liberty and human flourishing.

Sources: Gallup Earth Poll, Varieties of Democracy, 2006-2018. The figure reports the population-weighted clan between the 2006-2018 growth rate in religious freedom and the share of individuals who study that they are thriving. This measure of thriving is generated based on having a response of 7 or higher on a 10-point calibration about current life satisfaction and having a response of 8 or higher on a similar x-bespeak scale about expected time to come life satisfaction in five years (see Table 1).

https://doi.org/x.1371/journal.pone.0239983.g001

The beginning part of the paper documents two stylized facts virtually religious liberty and its correlation with diverse measures of economic development using the Gallup Globe Poll, the Varieties of Democracy ("5-Dem"), and the Earth Banking company. First, the boilerplate (median) country has experienced an eight% (13%) decline in religious liberty between 2006 and 2018. These declines are, perhaps counterintuitively, concentrated among countries with greater economic liberty, especially those with stronger holding rights. Second, a strong positive correlation between religious liberty and economical freedom even so exists in the cantankerous-section, which is related with a large literature on the role of institutions for economical development [7, 10]. These results are too consistent with prior literature that religious freedom is positively associated with nigh all of the pillars of global competitiveness in the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index [three, iv], suggesting that religious liberty is a prerequisite, or at least a complementary factor, for other forms of economic development and economic liberty.

The second part of the paper quantifies a plausibly causal effect of religious liberty on homo flourishing. Using year-to-yr variation in changes in the social and governmental regulation of religion between 2006 and 2018, a standard deviation (sd) increment in religious liberty is associated with a 0.03 per centum point (pp) ascent in the probability that an individual is thriving and a 0.08sd rise in individual well-being. These improvements in human flourishing are full-bodied among religious minorities. To put these estimates in perspective, since but 26% of the sample reports that they are thriving, the marginal issue of a standard divergence change in religious liberty—equivalent to transforming a country like Russia into the United states—amounts to approximately an xi% increment in the share of thriving individuals.

The baseline specification controls for not simply country and year stock-still effects, but too a broad array of demographic and country-specific fourth dimension-varying factors, such as economic growth and institutional quality. While these controls help mitigate the concern that there are unobserved shocks affecting homo flourishing that are also correlated with religious liberty, they may fail to control for the potential negative association between economic growth and religious affiliation that has been suggested in prior literature. As an alternative identification strategy, I exploit plausibly exogenous historical variation in the exposure of missionaries across countries [11]. The identifying supposition is that exposure to missionaries prior to 1923 increases the probability that a country has more than egalitarian norms governing religious liberty today, but does non impact human flourishing through other channels besides religious liberty. The resulting estimates are larger than the least squares estimates, suggesting that the baseline provides a lower bound.

These results could be consistent with at least one of three different mechanisms. First, religious freedom could lead to an increment in well-being through its furnishings on democratic governance and freedom of expression since individuals are empowered to believe what they desire and participate in the civics process. Second, by placing an emphasis on religious pluralism and competition amongst different worldview for the pursuit of truth, it could lead to greater educational attainment. 3rd, information technology could reduce the probability of entering into ceremonious state of war and other forms of armed disharmonize. Using additional data on these country-specific outcomes between 1995 and 2018, the results are primarily consistent with the first mechanism: increases in religious liberty affect well-being through its effects on democratic governance and freedom. For example, there are economically and statistically strong positive associations betwixt religious liberty and civil liberties, women empowerment, access to justice, and freedom of expression, as well every bit some negative associations with public and political corruption even after decision-making for time-varying measures of economic functioning and both state and year stock-still effects. These results are consequent with contributions on the complementarity of social majuscule and autonomous institutions [12–14].

This newspaper contributes to two literatures. The first investigates the part of institutions on economic development [15]. Although an active debate remains over the exact quantitative effects of institutions on economic evolution, there is causal evidence documenting the importance of belongings rights [seven], regulation [16], and the adverse consequences of colonialism [half dozen, ten] for economic evolution. There is besides a large political scientific discipline literature about the furnishings of democratic institutions on stability [17] and economic growth [18].

However, beyond these empirical investigations of political and economic institutions, there is a much smaller literature nearly the furnishings of religious institutions on measures of human flourishing and economic development [nineteen]. This paper contributes to an ongoing debate most the effects of religious pluralism on religious vitality. Some testify supports "the supply-side view"—that greater religious pluralism was associated with greater church omnipresence in the United States [20–22] and across the globe [23–26]—a vigorous argue remains over whether the relationship is negative [27–29] or potentially cypher [xxx]. Past finding that increases in religious liberty atomic number 82 to increases in human flourishing, this paper provides new microeconomic show consequent with the supply-side view that religious participation and well-existence thrive nether pluralism.

The second literature investigates the effect of culture (due east.g., religious amalgamation) and institutions on economic development [31]. There has been a full general recognition that religious practices and beliefs affect economic activity at a microeconomic level [32], ranging from subjective well beingness [33] to criminal action [34] and educational attainment [35]. These theories also take amass implications, including whether religious amalgamation is associated with economic growth on a console of countries [8]. Similarly, motivated by evidence that more than religious people tend to exist more trusting and more than trustworthy [36], some have found that religious affiliation is negatively associated with attitudes most innovation [37]. Withal, causal inference has been challenging [38].

Using plausibly exogenous fluctuations in the lunar cycle and the resulting hours in a 24-hour interval, i report found a negative clan betwixt fasting during Ramadan and economic growth [9]. While the identification strategy allows for a more causal estimation than traditional estimates, one limitation is that the identifying variation comes from only minor movements in the hours available each twenty-four hours, making it challenging to extrapolate out of sample. Moreover, their analysis is restricted to the fix of Muslim adherents beyond countries. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the economic furnishings of religious affiliation by focusing more than broadly on religious liberty, which is important for protecting against religious persecution [39]. Moreover, this paper draws on much more comprehensive information that covers over 150 countries annually for over a decade, contrasting with prior studies that have used the Globe Values Survey (WVS), which covers roughly fifty countries with smaller samples and fewer questions that reflect the concept of human flourishing [40].

The structure of the paper is as follows. Department 2 introduces the new data and measurement strategy. Section three describes the empirical strategy and presents the master results. Section four investigates the mechanisms behind this result. Section five concludes.

Data, measurement, and key patterns

Repeated cantankerous-section of well-being (2006-2018)

The primary dataset in this analysis is the Earth Gallup Poll, which contains surveys from over 150 countries that brand upwards 98% of the globe's population based on randomly selected and nationally representative samples. While these surveys are launched multiple times a year in virtually countries, all countries have the survey administered at least once, barring severe extenuating circumstances. The baseline empirical specification pools all countries together, only the results are robust to restricting the sample to countries observed at least eleven times, as well as to a fully balanced console, although the standard errors ascent marginally. (The matched information includes responses from 156 countries observed for at to the lowest degree five years betwixt 2006 and 2018 with between 290 and 11,420 respondents within a given twelvemonth depending on the country. Roughly eighty% of countries are observed at least 11 times and 47% are observed all 13 years.) Survey questions are designed to cover a wide assortment of key indicators, including law & order, food & shelter, job creation, migration, financial well-being, personal health, civic appointment, and evaluative well-being.

Each questionnaire is translated into the major conversational linguistic communication in each country. To maximize accessibility, two approaches can be used. The first approach involves completing two independent translations with an independent 3rd party who besides has some knowledge of survey inquiry methods who adjudicates the differences. A professional translator will after translate the final version back into the source linguistic communication. The second arroyo involves using a translator to translate the survey into the target language and an independent translator back into the source language. An independent third political party with knowledge of survey methods will review and make any final translation modifications. Interviewers for each land are instructed to follow the script and not to deviate from the translated language.

Gallup selects quality vendors with experience in survey design and implementation with in-depth preparation sessions with local field staff prior to the beginning of information collection. Gallup also follows ESOMAR standards for quality control. A supervisor accompanies each interviewer for i total interview within the first two days of interviewing and the supervisor accompanies interviews on a minimum of 5% of subsequent interviews. Interviewers re-contact a minimum of fifteen% of households to ensure correct execution of random road procedures and inside-household selection. Telephone surveys are used in countries where coverage represents at least eighty% of the population. Data that is gathered is also standardized so that it is comparable across countries, e.g., educational activity (simple, secondary, and tertiary) and income.

Table 1 enumerates the questions used in the survey design to measure well-beingness. 2 main measures are employed. The first is an indicator for whether an private reports that they are thriving. Equally Tabular array 1 describes, individuals are surveyed on a scale of 0 to 10 about their current and expected future (in five years) life satisfaction. If an individual reports at least a 7/ten on current life satisfaction and at to the lowest degree an 8/10 on expected future life satisfaction, they are classified as thriving. The second conducts a principal component analysis (PCA) over four standard normal measures of subjective well-being: daily experience, optimism, positive experience, and negative experience. The resulting latent index extracts the mutual signal among each of these four measures, which is more probable to reflect the broader concept of human flourishing [forty]. Nonetheless, the results are statistically duplicate from those obtained from a simpler heuristic, like the unweighted average across each of the four sub-indices, is used.

Both these measures are comparable with the measures of happiness from the Earth Values Survey. For example, some apply an indicator for whether an private reports "quite happy" or "very happy" in response to the question: "Taking all things together, would you say you are: non at all happy, not very happy, quite happy, very happy?" [9]. Similarly, some as well create an indicator for whether the respondent reports a value in a higher place 5 in response to the question "How satisfied are yous with your life as a whole these days," which is asked on a numerical 10-betoken scale. In this sense, while the Gallup data provides several comparable measures to the WVS, information technology likewise provides a wide range of boosted responses about institutions, human flourishing, and religious affiliation.

Fourth dimension-varying measure of religious liberty and institutions

While there are several sources of data on religious liberty available, like the Pew Research Center'south measurement of government restrictions and social hostilities [41], the Varieties of Democracy ("5-Dem") has emerged as the kickoff endeavour to measure a wide array of cross-country institutional characteristics on a consistent and continuous basis twelvemonth-later-yr using a combination of state-of-the-art statistical methods and expert elicitation [42].

Different standard approaches that produce an index based on the response to specific questions, V-Dem treats each measure as an inherently latent variable that (approximately five) expert raters only find manifestations of in a dissonance environment. This approach, known equally differential item functioning (DIF), perceive latent authorities characteristics that map into ordinal scales in V-Dem. Recognizing that each adept will translate questions differently, 5-Dem allows for the possibility that raters apply different thresholds when they map their perceptions of latent traits into ordinal ratings for each of the different measures. As long as the errors in each of these measurements are uncorrelated with each other, the covariance across them will identify the latent distribution.

1 concern with this approach is that experts may vary in non-random ways beyond countries. For example, if countries with lower productivity attract lower quality experts, then the ratings for some countries might be lower than others and correlate in unobserved means with human flourishing. However, because V-Dem allows raters to apply dissimilar thresholds when they map their perceptions into the ordinal scales, V-Dem produces a standard departure of each measurement, which can serve as a control for potential classical or non-classical measurement error in the index of involvement.

This paper focuses on the measurement of 1 specific alphabetize from Five-Dem: religious freedom. The survey question on religious liberty asks about "the extent to which individuals and groups have the correct to cull a religion, change their religion, and do that faith in private or in public every bit well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public government." Tabular array 2 documents the ordinal calibration that range between zero and four, together with the corresponding responses from the experts who are being surveyed.

This approach is a form of item response theory (IRT), which provides ways for dealing with disagreement amid experts over inherently subjective assessments. Although they are much more complex than simple heuristics, like an boilerplate across survey respondents, they exhibit much better functioning [43]. One reason is the ability to control and explicitly model survey respondent reliability. Because experts in the V-Dem survey answer multiple questions, multiple answers that deviate from the norm will produce a lower reliability, thereby generating lower weights in the inclusion of the respondent's answer in the overall score.

To understand how these data compare with more than conventional sources that are merely available in the cross-section (i.e., not panel), Fig 2 plots the V-Dem mensurate of religious liberty with the 2 indices of government restrictions and social hostilities from the Pew Research Eye. These variables are presented in their standard normal form with a mean of zip and standard deviation of one. Not surprisingly, there are strong negative correlations between the 2, specially between government restrictions and V-Dem (with a correlation of -0.77). The fact that the 5-Dem data is negatively correlated with both of these indices suggests that it is capturing features of both formal government policies that restrict religion and informal social hostilities that create pressure confronting religious freedom and pluralism.

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Fig ii. Comparing of varieties of commonwealth and Pew research data.

Sources: Varieties of Democracy ("5-Dem") Pew Research Center, 2007, 2016, 2017. The figures plots the standardized z-scores of religious liberty from V-DEM and government restrictions and social hostilities from the Pew Research Center.

https://doi.org/ten.1371/journal.pone.0239983.g002

World bank console of land characteristics

The chief supplementary data is from the Globe Banking company, which contains time-varying state economic and demographic characteristics, such as GDP and employment growth, and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economical Liberty, which contains fourth dimension-varying country measures of institutional quality. Comparable with the Fraser Institute, these variables are of import for not but decision-making covariates in the main regression, merely also determining mediating influences [44]. For case, changes in economical growth are often precipitated by changes in economical liberty [45].

Does religious liberty simply proxy for other, more than traditional measures of institutional quality? While the next section will explore some bivariate correlations, Tabular array 3 begins by estimating cross-sectional regressions of religious liberty on various dimensions of economic liberty (equally z-scores), controlling for a few fourth dimension-varying state characteristics, such as GDP growth and population. Hither, overall economic freedom consists of four categories: rule of constabulary (property rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness), government size (regime spending, revenue enhancement brunt, fiscal health), regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary liberty), and open markets (merchandise freedom, investment liberty, and fiscal freedom).

There is a stiff positive association for each of these measures: a 1sd rise in overall economic liberty is associated with a 0.24sd rising in religious liberty, provisional on controls. Interestingly, property rights are well-nigh closely correlated with religious freedom. In fact, information technology is the just characteristic of economic freedom that systematically enters in a statistically and economically significant style across specifications, particularly in column 6 where each dimension is included as a command. These results suggest that, while economical freedom is correlated with religious liberty, the latter is detecting a fundamentally unlike dimension of institutional quality, consistent with existing cross-sectional evidence [4].

While religious liberty is correlated with other measures of institutional quality, information technology is capturing systematically different features across countries. Using an boilerplate between 1995 and 2018, Fig iii plots population-weighted correlations between standardized religious liberty and four measures of institutions: belongings rights, regime integrity, business organization freedom, and labor liberty. The strongest correlation is between religious liberty and holding rights, which is 0.67 (Console A), suggesting that areas with stronger ownership over property rights also showroom greater religious liberty. The correlations with government integrity and business freedom are 0.43 and 0.51 (Panels B and C), respectively. (The respective population-weighted correlation with the logarithm of per capita Gross domestic product is 0.30.) These results are consequent with prior literature that religious freedom is positively associated with almost all of the pillars of global competitiveness in the World Economical Forum'southward Global Competitiveness Index [iii, 4].

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Fig 3. Religious liberty and heritage index of economical liberty correlations.

Sources: Varieties of Democracy and Heritage Foundation. The figure plots the population-weighted human relationship betwixt standard normal measures of religious liberty and institutional quality measured with belongings rights and labor market liberty. These indices are standardized based on their 1995-2018 average.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239983.g003

Moreover, the 5-Dem data contains significant within-country variation. To provide a label of this variation, Fig four plots the distribution of growth rates in religious liberty indices betwixt 2006 and 2018 across countries. However, there has been a large decline in religious liberty over these years—a mean of 8.one% and a median of xiii.25%. Importantly, however, the fact that there is such wide variation (standard deviation = 0.57) is important for the identification strategy, which exploits year-to-twelvemonth changes in religious freedom and human flourishing.

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Fig 4. Distribution in growth in religious freedom, 2006-2018.

Sources: Varieties of Commonwealth. The figure plots the distribution of growth rates in the religious liberty index between 2006 and 2018 across countries. The sample is trimmed so that there is no observation with a growth rate above 300% or beneath -300%.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239983.g004

What countries have experienced greater declines in religious liberty over others? Perhaps surprisingly, more developed countries have. Fig five investigates the relationship between growth in religious liberty over 2006-2018 and two measures of economic development: the strength of property rights and the logarithm of GDP per capita. While growth in religious liberty exhibits a -0.18 correlation with the strength of belongings rights, it has a 0.13 correlation with logged GDP per capita. This suggests that, while religious liberty generally expanded in more economically developed countries, it nonetheless declined in many countries that tend to rank higher in holding rights and the rule of law. For example, Denmark exhibited a 55.6% pass up, French republic a 38.9% decline, the Usa a 35.i% pass up, and the United Kingdom a 24.9% decline.

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Fig v. Growth in religious liberty and measures of economic evolution.

Sources: Varieties of Republic, World Bank, and Heritage Foundation. The figure plots the population-weighted relationship between the growth in religious liberty between 2006 and 2018 and an index of property rights and GDP per capita (averaged over 2006 and 2018 levels.

https://doi.org/10.1371/periodical.pone.0239983.g005

Methodological approach

There is now robust evidence on the cross-sectional correlation between measures of economic development & well-existence and religious liberty [3, four, 46]. While these studies have generally controlled for diverse country-specific factors, ranging from tax rates to economic activity, such a correlation could still reflect confounding factors that prevent a causal interpretation. This section at present outlines a more rigorous approach for causal identification. The main empirical specification, pooling countries observed from 2006 to 2018, examines whether increases in religious liberty are associated with increases in measures of human flourishing through panel regressions of the course: (1) where WB denotes the measures of subjective well-beingness, RL denotes a standardized measure out of religious liberty, D denotes a vector of individual demographic characteristics, Ten denotes a vector of land-level economic and industry factors, and η and λ announce fixed effects on country and twelvemonth. To control for measurement error in religious freedom, I also control for the standard deviation of the religious liberty mensurate. Consistent with the view that measurement error is likely to attenuate the estimates, the results are less statistically pregnant absent-minded the standard deviation inserted as a control. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level [47].

The inclusion of country and year effects is important for identification since countries vary in remarkably unlike ways that are often difficult to measure, namely the office of institutions on economic evolution [6, 10, 18]. In addition to individual demographic characteristics that control for differences in well-being (gender, historic period, number of children, and didactics fixed effects), the inclusion of time-varying country-specific factors, such every bit Gross domestic product growth and industry limerick, purges variation in economic activity that could coincide with both political liberalization and human flourishing. For example, if Gdp growth increases, then subjective well-being will ascension at the same time that political leadership could experience less compelled to regulate organized religion. Similarly, differences in the agricultural and services employment shares is correlated with a country's phase of economical development. Moreover, to address the possibility that political reforms coincide with economic reforms, indices of property rights, concern freedom, and labor freedom from the Heritage Foundation'due south Alphabetize of Economic Freedom are included equally controls.

The identifying supposition in Eq 1 is that unobserved shocks to individual well-being are uncorrelated with changes in religious liberty, conditional on diverse time-varying individual and country characteristics. While prior literature has often taken regime and social regulations over religion as exogenous (e.g., [eight]), Eq ane may still produce biased estimates for two reasons. First, to the extent at that place are other unobserved determinants of well-beingness that are not captured past the land-specific controls, and so estimates of γ are upwards biased. Second, given prior research that has found a negative association betwixt measures of religious affiliation and economic growth [8, 9], increases in religious freedom could pb to increases in religious affiliation, producing down bias on γ. These combined forces imply that the naive estimates may be either upwards or downwards biased depending on the forcefulness of one force over some other.

Although the land-specific controls are fairly detailed, I also pursue an alternative identification strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in historical exposure to missionaries [11, 48, 49]. In particular, Robert Woodberry constructed a dataset with 143 countries, containing information on the number of Christian missionaries through the 1925 Globe Missionary Atlas [eleven]. Drawing on his measure of missionary exposure, measured through both Protestant and Catholic missionaries per ten,000 individuals in 1923, I notice a strong relationship betwixt them and religious liberty averaged between 2006 and 2018, producing correlations of 0.27 and 0.33, respectively. These results propose that countries with greater exposure to missionaries (either Protestant or Catholic) prior to 1923 accept greater contemporaneous levels of religious liberty.

Chiefly, these two variables leverage heterogeneity in the exposure of a country to different types and quantities of missionaries (Protestant and Catholic), which may take had different effects on a state's development of institutions. This is reasonable given that missionaries, especially "conversionary Protestants" (CPs), "had a unique office in spreading mass didactics, printing, civil social club, and other factors that scholars fence fostered democracy" [11]. In detail, rather than building on exploitation from colonial development [6], missionaries publicly advocated for changes in colonial policy, fought for the transfer of ideas, and helped ethnic peoples organize anti-colonial movements [50, 51]. These findings build on a larger literature linking Protestantism and modern representative democracy [52–54].

One reason that could motivate the plausible exogeneity of missionary exposure could stalk from the fact that information prior to 1923 diffused much slower than today's news because of the internet. Because conditions across different countries were not common knowledge, it is unlikely that missionaries were optimizing what country to get to in a manner that is correlated with future weather. Moreover, since countries that received more missionaries besides required greater back up, option effects could fifty-fifty produce down bias since the instrument would predict lower levels of religious liberty due to persistence in negative option effects. Nonetheless, there is some bear witness that missionaries might have gone towards countries that had better conditions, then the 4 specifications presented later command for a handful of geographic, climate, and even wellness and mortality weather condition [55].

On the other manus, a separate threat to the identifying assumption is that exposure to missionaries affects contemporaneous well-being through many other channels—not simply religious liberty. That is, if exposure leads to more pluralistic and democratic institutions that are also more conducive to growth, better at educating citizens, and/or reduce the propensity for conflict, then the instrument might overestimate the causal effect on religious liberty on well-existence. I address this business organisation past controlling for various factors, such as economic growth and industrial composition, helping isolate the variation that stems from the effect of exposure on religious pluralism.

Main results and robustness

Tabular array 4 documents the results associated with the baseline specification. Columns 1 and 9 begin by presenting the raw unconditional correlation: a 1sd rise in religious liberty is associated with a 0.04pp increase in the probability that an individual is thriving, but no economically or statistically significant increase in overall well-being. As discussed before, however, the unconditional correlation betwixt religious liberty and human flourishing, specially for this broader measure out, reflects 2 confounding forces: countries with greater religious liberty also exhibit greater economic freedoms (Fig 3), but greater religious liberty could increase religious affiliation that counteracts economic growth. The subsequent two columns introduce individual demographic and state-specific controls, but the point estimates remain largely duplicate from the unconditional correlation reported earlier.

While males report 0.05sd college levels of well-being, they are one-2% less likely to report that they are thriving. Individuals who are married are more likely to be thriving have higher well-being, merely older individuals and those with families report slightly lower levels. Turning towards education, since the omitted grouping is those with over a secondary education, the fact that the point estimates on elementary and secondary education are negative suggests that in that location is a strong association between educational attainment and human being flourishing. Turning towards the country-specific controls that begin to appear in columns three and 11, in that location is a positive association between real GDP growth and human flourishing, equally is real Gross domestic product per capita (not reported) consistent with bear witness on the Easterlin hypothesis [56]. Larger countries (at least in population) tend to accept lower levels of human flourishing, which could reflect greater competition for scarce resource. Moreover, the agricultural employment share is negatively correlated with human being flourishing, which reflects the fact that these countries are at an earlier phase of the evolution procedure [57].

Columns four and 12 present the baseline specification that contains the standard controls and fixed furnishings on both state and year, suggesting that 1sd ascension in religious liberty is associated with a 0.03pp rise in the probability that an individual is thriving and a 0.08sd rise in individual well-being. The marginal effect of a standard deviation on an indicator for whether an individual is thriving declines to 0.022 (p-value = 0.064) when the sample is restricted to a fully balanced gear up of countries. Approximately 47% of countries are observed each yr from 2006 to 2018, but nearly 81% are observed at least 11 times over those years. Moreover, the number of times that a state is observed is only weakly correlated (ρ = 0.10) with the upshot variable, suggesting that measurement error is unlikely to generate bias.

Do these point estimates reverberate potential upward bias emerging from unobserved heterogeneity in the quality of institutions? To investigate the office of unobserved heterogeneity, columns v-8 and 13-16 sequentially introduce measures of property rights, business liberty, and labor freedom as additional controls. Even so, these variables tend to produce statistically insignificant estimates, suggesting that they are not culprits behind potential omitted variables bias. Moreover, the fact that the point estimates on religious liberty are not statistically dissimilar from the baseline suggests that any unobserved determinants of human flourishing are probable but weakly correlated with religious liberty [58].

Are these gains in individual well-being the result of the indirect effect of the potentially beneficial effects of religious liberty on economical development? While various time-varying controls were included in the before results, I at present investigate regressions of economic activity on religious liberty under similar specifications. Tabular array 5 documents these results. Both the OLS and Iron estimates are presented for completeness, simply the FE estimates are preferred because they remove potentially problematic time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.

At that place is a positive, merely statistically insignificant at conventional levels, effect of improvements in religious liberty on real GDP and GDP growth. This could be a result of endogeneity emerging from the potentially negative contemporaneous effect of religious affiliation on productivity, just information technology nonetheless suggests that the results from Table 4 are unlikely plagued by these concerns near omitted variables. There is also a positive, and statistically significant at the x% level, result of religious freedom on school enrollment in secondary education as a share of gross enrollment. This is consistent with the view that increased religious pluralism encourages greater pursuit of educational attainment and creativity, but no causal interpretation can exist ascribed to these results.

To sympathize whether these results reflect a 18-carat causal outcome between religious liberty and human flourishing, a useful placebo test involves examining whether the improvements in human flourishing are concentrated among religious individuals. Using information on religious affiliation, which is bachelor for roughly 85% of the sample, I judge a modified version of Eq 1 that allows for an interaction betwixt a measure of religious affiliation and religious liberty: (ii) where now r denotes an indicator for religious amalgamation. I focus on two measures: whether the individual considers themselves religious and whether the individual considers themselves a Christian. Letting the consequence variable denote overall well-being, I observe that (p-value = 0.225) for individuals who identify as religious and (p-value = 0.00) for individuals who identify every bit Christian or Jewish. This suggests that, while religious individuals benefit overall from improvements in religious liberty, the benefits are concentrated amidst Christians and Jews. One potential explanation backside this result arises from the fact that Christians and Jews are persecuted in many countries that rank low on levels of religious liberty, such as the Heart E and Red china, meaning that they are likely the largest beneficiaries of improvements in religious liberty.

Nonetheless, these stock-still effects specifications could nonetheless produce downwards biased estimates of the causal effect of religious freedom on man flourishing because of the negative clan between religious affiliation and economical growth [eight, ix]. To address these concerns, I now exploit plausibly exogenous historical variation in exposure to missionaries prior to 1923. The identifying supposition is that, after controlling for contemporaneous country-specific factors, such equally economic activity and institutional quality, the result of missionaries on human flourishing operates just through its effects on improvements in religious freedom.

The exclusion brake could be violated in several means. If missionary exposure affects economic evolution through other channels, then we might overestimate the furnishings of missions on human being flourishing. To address the possibility, I control for geographic characteristics (whether the land is an island, whether information technology is landlocked, and latitude), average temperature in the hottest and coldest month, and whether there was a malaria epidemic in the country, on top of the standard individual and contemporaneous state controls that are in the baseline specification [xi]. These controls also address the possibility that sure countries might have had ameliorate transportation networks or a lower incidence of disease, which could bear on the attractiveness or ability for missionaries to become to the country in the first identify [55]. Subsequent work has explored answers to these concerns nigh omitted variables in much greater detail [59].

Turning towards these IV results, I find that a 1sd rising in religious liberty is associated with a 0.084 pct point (p-value = 0.002) rising in the probability that an individual reports that they are thriving, which is larger than the marginal result of 0.018 in the baseline specification. While the F-statistic is but vii, thus below the rule-of-thumb of ten, the marginal effect is nonetheless statistically significant. However, because the instrument is cross-sectional, standard errors are at present clustered at the land-by-year level. Moreover, if additional controls on bloodshed status, life expectancy, urbanization, and population density equally of 1500 are added as additional historical controls, the marginal result declines to 0.023, which is statistically indistinguishable from the 0.018 in the earlier results. In this sense, the IV results provide complementary support that the baseline specification reflects a genuine causal effect.

Understanding the mechanisms

At that place are at to the lowest degree 3 mechanisms that could explain the observed positive furnishings. Starting time, it is possible that religious liberty creates the seeds for democracy by producing a space where cocky-expression and public discourse is free and open. Empirical evidence suggests that these factors were of import for the emergence and continuity of commonwealth in Europe and N America [52–54]. Although some debate that democracy was developed purely through Enlightenment ideas, countries that developed democracies purely on the ground of Enlightenment ideals were generally not stable [threescore] and/or consisted of just the elites [61, 62]. For example, in that location is evidence, particularly amidst conversionary Protestants, that religious movements and the presence of religious freedom led to the evolution of newspapers and print media through the press press, which leveraged public opinion to democratize society and decentralize ability from the elites [63].

2nd, another way that religious pluralism could be linked with improvements in well-being is through its effects on educational attainment. For case, much like elites in the nineteenth century resisted educating women and the poor based on the concern that it would pb to instability [64, 65], the promotion of religious freedom is driven by the conventionalities that each individual has the option and responsibility of pursuing truth and becoming educated on their terms, rather than by force [66]. The resulting improvements in educational attainment could have driven improvements in per capita income growth and human being flourishing [67].

Tertiary, religious liberty could mitigate the incidence of conflict and civil strife past promoting greater respect for i another and processes for resolving disputes. For example, many of the non-fierce tactics for social reform, such as boycotts and mass petitions, were piloted by religious organizations [68, 69]. Conversionary Protestants were particularly mutual organizers behind movements throughout the world, ranging from Great Britain [68, lxx] to the Usa [51] to Republic of india [71, 72]. [50]. At the cadre of these movements was the belief that all individuals are created equal with the ability and interest to thrive if given the opportunity, countering many of the colonial and grade-specific narratives that prevailed. Protestant Christians were particularly likely to enter and positively influence civil gild by enacting reforms and promoting peace [73–76]. Moreover, by promoting equality across traditional race and grade structures, religious forces were more than probable to create and maintain stable democracies and survive potential disciplinarian regimes that take over [77].

To investigate the relative importance of these competing mechanisms, Tabular array 6 considers both standard least squares and fixed effects estimates to capture cantankerous-sectional and within-state differences. Moreover, because these exercises make greater use of the World Banking concern and V-Dem data, the sample can extend further back to 1995 upwardly to 2018. The sample is fairly balanced with 165 to 168 countries each year. Starting with measures of educational attainment, there is positive association between religious liberty and schooling in the cross-department: a 1sd rise in religious liberty is associated with a 0.03pp and 0.06pp rise in secondary and tertiary school enrollment, merely no association with primary schoolhouse enrollment. Given that the averages are 0.77 and 0.35, respectively, the gauge for third schoolhouse is economically meaningful: a marginal event amounts to 17% (= 0.06/.35) of the mean. However, once country and twelvemonth fixed furnishings are introduced, these correlations vanish. One estimation is that the cross-section captures a long-term effect that religious liberty may take on well-being through changes in the education system, whereas the yr-to-yr variation is capturing more of the short to medium -run bear upon.

Turning towards measures of corruption equally a proxy for democratic governance, there is a strong moderating effect: a 1sd ascension in religious liberty is associated with a 0.29sd and 0.32sd decline in political and public corruption, respectively, in the cross-department and a 0.24sd and 0.18sd decline within a land over time. The fact that the estimate is stronger for political corruption is consistent with theory and show near the link between civic participation and democratic governance [78]: religious freedom and freedom of idea empowers individuals and encourages greater civic participation, thereby leading to greater accountability and transparency.

Turning towards more direct measures of democratic governance based on the practice of freedom, a 1sd rising in religious freedom is associated with a 0.59sd, 0.30sd, 0.34sd, and 0.55sd ascent in ceremonious liberties, women empowerment, access to justice, and freedom of expression, respectively, using only the within-country variation. The cross-sectional estimates are roughly 25-80% larger than the fixed furnishings estimates. The fact that improvements in religious liberty are so economically and statistically associated with improvements in these dimensions of liberty and ceremonious liberties suggests information technology is the chief machinery linking religious liberty and well-beingness. Finally, while in that location is a negative association betwixt the probability of being in an armed conflict and improvements in religious freedom, the clan is statistically insignificant.

Conclusion and policy implications

While these exercises practice not provide a silver-bullet caption behind the plausibly causal effect of improvements in religious liberty on dimensions of human flourishing, they propose that religious liberty—and, more broadly, social upper-case letter [79]—and autonomous institutions are complements, leading to greater liberty of expression and civil liberties for a state'southward people. Absent the basic human right for individuals to believe and worship freely, it is hard to imagine how a country tin can promote economical and social prosperity: suppression of idea volition necessarily inhibit entrepreneurship, innovation, and social welfare more broadly.

Using the most comprehensive database to date on measures of man flourishing across fourth dimension and infinite, this paper quantifies the effects of religious freedom, finding that a 1sd rise in religious liberty is associated with a 0.03pp rise in the probability an individual is thriving and a 0.08sd rise in overall well-beingness. The baseline identification strategy exploits plausibly exogenous yr-to-twelvemonth changes in religious liberty restrictions, controlling for a wide array of demographic and land-specific factors, such as GDP growth and institutional quality. To sympathize their robustness, an alternative instrumental variables strategy that exploits historical variation in the exposure of countries to missionaries prior to 1923 suggests slightly larger estimates on human flourishing.

These results bear witness that religious liberty should also be taken into account when constructing and evaluating measures of economic evolution and welfare. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville in Commonwealth in America argued that religious liberty in America would exist fundamental to its democratic governance and preservation of peace and stability, balancing the competing demands for materialism and religious fanaticism.

The results are particularly timely given the competition of values betwixt the U.s.a. and the Chinese Communist Political party (CCP) where, for example, religious minorities in China are persecuted [80]. Moreover, given the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic and the international backlash against their failure to warn against the spread of the virus [81, 82], the CCP has a unique opportunity to non but advance its own economic development through an expansion of religious liberty, merely also betoken to the international community that it is willing to make reasonable concessions on important human rights problems [46].

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Brian Grim, Byron Johnson, Gale Pooley, and Tyler VanderWeele for comments and suggestions. All errors and views are my own and do not represent whatever affiliated institutions.

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Source: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0239983

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